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2 
Oh happy victory!  It is to you alone Lord, not to us, the distinguished trophy of 
honor.  In one stroke you tore up the trunk, and the root, and the strewn earth of 
the heretical vermin.  Vermin, who were caught in snares that they had dared to 
set for your faithful subjects.  Oh favorable night!  Hour most desirable in which 
we placed our hope.1 
 
Michel de Roigny, On the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 1572 
 
 
The level of sectarian violence that erupted in Reformation France was extraordinary.  
Otherwise ordinary Catholics tortured their Huguenot neighbors to death and then afterwards 
mutilated their corpses, sometimes feeding the disfigured remains to farm animals.  Catholic 
children elicited applause from their coreligionists as they killed adult Huguenots by tearing 
them to pieces.  Huguenots assaulted Catholic priests during the Mass, pillaged Catholic 
churches, and desecrated the Host.  Indeed, as the sectarian duel increased in frequency and 
intensity, a man could be killed for calling someone a Huguenot; both sides used religion to 
rationalize the assassinations of dukes and kings. 
Our understanding of this violence depends on the suspension of our twenty-first century 
attitudes toward violent behavior.  Norbert Elias reminds us in his influential work on the 
development of Western mores that our modern view of violence has evolved over an extended 
period of time.  Specifically, Elias notes that the “courtization of warriors” and the 
monopolization of force by the state facilitated a “civilizing process” that originated within the 
European nobility in the seventeenth century and gradually penetrated the lower classes of 
European society.2  Over time, this process transformed Western society so much so that what 
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 Michel de Roigny, “Discours sur les occurrences des guerres intestines,” (Paris, 1572), 4.  “O heureuse victoire! À 
toy seul est Seigneur, non a nous, le trophee insigne de l’honneur.  D’un coup as araché le tronc, & la racine, et la 
terre ionché, d’heretique vermine.  Vermine, qui se prit la buit dans les filets, quelle avoit osé tendre aux fidelles 
subiects.  O favorable nuict! Heure plus desiree, qu’elle n’avoit esté des nostres esperée.” 
2
 Norbert Elais, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2000), 387-397; Power and Civility: The Civilizing Process: Volume II, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 255-258. 
3 
was once considered acceptable behavior in early modern France—a duel in response to a verbal 
insult—now seems excessive.3  Thus, I would like to ask the reader to suspend judgment when 
considering early modern violence in order to appreciate its normative aspect.4 
Roman Catholicism, albeit with local variations, dominated Western European religious 
life until the advent of the Reformation.5  The Catholic Church maintained this hegemony 
because it violently prevented the spread of heterodox beliefs.6  A prominent example of this is 
the Albigensian Crusade in which tens of thousands of French Cathars were killed from 1209-
1229.7  The vast majority of adherents to Catharism lived in southern France, the same 
geographic area that was most receptive to Protestantism after 1572.8  Protestants acknowledged 
this affinity as a crucial part of their identity, although recent scholarship has questioned the 
extent to which Catharism was an established church with a coherent system of beliefs.9  Indeed 
even during the conflict some crusaders were not sure whom to attack; one soldier supposedly 
asked the Cistercian abbot Arnaud Amalaric how to distinguish a heretic from a true believer.  
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 Stuart Carroll, Blood and Violence in Early Modern France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10. 
4
 William Beik recognizes that the French crowd “had a tolerance of physical violence which we do not share,” in  
“The Violence of the French Crowd from Charivari to Revolution,” Past and Present 197 (2007): 86; and Denis 
Crouzet acknowledges the “immense distance” that separates us from our subject matter: “Face à cette fin du XVIe 
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de la Saint-Bathélemy: Un rêve perdu de la Renaissance (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 12-13. 
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 Diarmaid MacCulloch, “The Second Pillar: Papal Primacy,” in The Reformation: A History (New York: Penguin 
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 Contrary to what some historians have argued, heresy executions did not suddenly appear ex nihilo in the 
Reformation.  William Monter, “Heresy Executions in Reformation Europe, 1520-1565,” in Tolerance and 
Intolerance in the European Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 61-62. 
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 The estimated number of casualties widely varies among the sources. 
8
 Penny Roberts, “Calvinists in Troyes 1562-1572: The Legacy of Vassy and the Background to Saint 
Bartholomew,” in Calvinism in Europe, 1540-1620 ed. Andrew Pettegree, Alastair Duke, and Gillian Lewis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 100. 
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 Luc Racaut, “Religious Polemic and Huguenot Self-Perception and Identity, 1554-1619,” in Society and Culture in 
the Huguenot World, 1559-1685 ed. Raymond A. Mentzer and Andrew Spicer (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 41; Mark Gregory Pegg, A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  Other scholars question the very existence of medieval heresy as a thing 
in itself: R.I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Authority and Deviance in Western 
Europe 950-1250, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 64. 
4 
The abbot allegedly responded, “Kill them all!  God will recognize his own.”10  The impulse to 
kill the adherents of heterodoxy was an integral part of medieval religiosity. 
The existence of a widespread alternative faith in open conflict with the established 
church was a momentous innovation.11  Many sixteenth century Frenchmen responded to this 
situation with the same impulse to commit violence as their medieval forbearers.12  Thus, in the 
St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, Catholics painted white crosses on their hats to identify 
themselves, and they killed anyone who did not follow suit.  Some Catholics were killed by 
mistake, and yet the rioters generally believed that God would not hold them accountable for the 
errors.13  The Reformation inherited more from the medieval period than a general tendency to 
commit violence against adherents of alternative belief systems.  An analysis of the patterns of 
violence that accompanied the Protestant and Catholic Reformations in France reveals that the 
Wars of Religion forced Frenchmen to adapt older forms of violence from the medieval period to 
a new reality. 
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 John C. Moore, Pope Innocent III (1160/61-1216): To Root up and to Plant (Boston: Brill, 2003), 180. 
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 Philip Benedict, “Un roi, une loi, deux fois: Parameters for the History of Catholic-Reformed Co-existence in 
France, 1555-1685,” in Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation, ed. Ole Peter Grell and Bob 
Scribner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 68. 
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the early modern period: Gregory Hanlon, Confessions and Community in Seventeenth-Century France: Catholic 
and Protestant Coexistence in Aquitaine (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); Robert Sauzet, 
Contre-réforme et le réforme catholique en Bas-Languedoc: le diocèse de Nîmes au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Publications 
de la Sorbonne, 1979). 
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 Frederic J. Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries: The Political Thought of the French Catholic League (Genève: 
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I. Popular Violence: The Crowd during the Wars of Religion 
When [Coligny] promised himself 
An assured victory 
On the other foot he walked and danced 
Because he was an infidel. 
He wanted so much to massacre 
The little lambs of the Great Shepherd 
On account of his presumptuous pride, 
He who was so vicious. 14 
 
Benoist Rigaud, On Coligny’s role in the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre 
 
 
 One historian defines popular violence as the “social interaction involving threatened or 
real physical damage to persons or property, carried out by a group of individuals on the spot or 
through prior planning.”15  Popular violence can be divided into three categories: isolated actions 
committed by a group of people against one person; local rioting by a crowd against one or more 
targets; and open rebellion across multiple regions.16  Religious motivations for violence are 
most clearly evident in the second of these categories.  The majority of these religious riots took 
place during the decade from the Massacre at Vassy in 1562 to St. Bartholomew’s Day in 1572, 
which historians have termed the “golden age of the religious riot.”17 
The terms “popular” and “collective” simply mean non-battlefield violence that was 
acceptable to, or practiced by, a crowd of the same religious identity.18  The terms do not mean 
that every member of a particular religious denomination participated in the violence, or that 
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 Benoist Rigaud, “Discours contre les Huguenotz,” (Lyon, 1573), 7.  “Quand [Admiral Coligny] se promettoit/ 
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 William Beik adapts this definition in “The Violence of the French Crowd” (p. 78) from Charles Tilly, The 
Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3-4. 
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 Phillip Benedict, Rouen During the Wars of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 238. 
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 Natalie Z. Davis defines popular violence as that which was committed “by people who were not acting officially 
and formally as agents of political and ecclesiastical authority.”  “Rites of Violence,” in Society and Culture in Early 
Modern France: Eight Essays by Natalie Zemon Davis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 153.   
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most even approved of it.  Thus the definition of popular religious violence includes the 
Huguenots who vandalized Catholic churches as well as the Catholics who mutilated Huguenot 
corpses, even if most Huguenots and Catholics did not actually partake in this violence. 
The typical religious riot was not an uncontrolled mob of religious fanatics roaming 
around town and committing random acts of violence.  Rioters usually came from the menu 
peuple, those who “derived their livings from skilled or semiskilled crafts, shops, or small 
agricultural holdings.”19  The crowd was bound together by a social network: family members, 
friends, coworkers, and fellow parishioners typically rioted together. 20  Many riots occurred for 
local reasons and had specific targets.  For example, in Dijon in October 1561, Protestant 
businessmen started rioting because the authorities were unfairly favoring Catholic interests at 
the marketplace.  Local wine growers, whose businesses bound them to the Roman Church, 
responded by starting their own riot, which forced the Protestants to leave Dijon.21 
 Men were not the only ones who rioted in Reformation France—women also played a 
prominent role.  Since the Old Regime limited the criminal liability of women, they were easily 
tempted to act out public feelings of resentment with impunity.22  Some of the most violent 
rioters were the youngest, usually less than fifteen years old.  On July 23, 1562 in Paris, as soon 
as a Huguenot was executed for sedition, children seized the corpse, dragged it through the mud, 
ripped it apart, and threw it into the river.23  Children displayed a propensity to participate in 
violence for two reasons: first, peer pressure served as a motivation for excessively violent 
actions; second, several studies have shown that young people are especially susceptible to 
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 Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe, 205. 
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 Ibid., 186-188. 
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 Robert J. Knecht, The French Civil Wars, 1562-1598 (New York: Longman, 2000), 76-77. 
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 Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe, 206. 
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 David Potter, ed. and trans., The French Wars of Religion: Selected Documents (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1997), 62. 
7 
propaganda.  The content of sermons and political pamphlets during the Wars of Religion was 
extremely divisive.  In other words, partisan leaders directed their vitriol against members of the 
opposing faith, and young people, more than any other demographic, took the rhetoric seriously. 
 The notion of legitimacy was a central characteristic of the religious riot.  The presence 
of leaders within the crowd was very important; they sanctioned the rioters’ actions and allowed 
them to act freely.24  Crowd leadership also carried the added benefit of minimizing bloodshed.  
Massacres occurred because either the crowd’s violence spiraled out of control or because the 
crowd lacked clear leadership.  In both cases, rioters sought to legitimize their actions by 
appealing to authority.  Riots frequently started with the ringing of the tocsin, the official sign for 
a civic emergency.25  Even in the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, the ultimate example of 
unrestricted bloodletting, Catholics believed that the king had sanctioned their actions—Henry 
Duke of Guise allegedly uttered, “It is the king’s command.”26  Since these words suggested that 
the violence represented the royal will, this utterance can be understood as the explanation for 
why the massacre became so bloody. 
A large and growing body of literature also suggests that early modern crowd violence 
was not blind violence.  Religious riots occurred for five main reasons.  First, crowds wanted to 
carry out official justice by popular demand in reaction to a specific offense against the 
community.  This motivation can be seen under the framework of a “moral economy,” wherein 
the crowd acted defensively to restore a violated norm.27  Crowds held a “legitimizing notion” of 
their actions: “…the men and women in the crowd were informed by the belief that they were 
                                                 
24
 Davis, “Rites of Violence,” 165-166. 
25
 Ibid., 162. 
26
 Barbara Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 99 
27
 Neil Smelser classifies this type of violence as a “value-oriented movement.”  Theory of Collective Behavior 
(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 315. 
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defending traditional rights or customs; and, in general, that they were supported by the wider 
consensus of the community.”28  This violence was limited in scope and directed against defined 
targets.  Although the term “moral economy” was originally intended to elicit meaning from 
English bread riots, one historian applies this framework to the French religious riot, stating, 
“When the magistrate had not used his sword to defend the faith and the true church and to 
punish the idolaters, then the crowd would do it for him.”29  Consider the Parisian parish of 
Saint-Médard in the fall of 1561.  Protestants, suspecting an attack, orchestrated an assault on 
their Catholic counterparts and led them off to the Châtelet.30  According to the “moral 
economy” paradigm, the crowd’s actions should be understood as a response to a perceived 
injustice that the rioters sought to correct. 
 Second, crowds actively carried out justice when they believed the authorities were 
dysfunctional or deficient.  For example, in 1551 a group of masked Protestants kidnapped a 
goldsmith’s journeyman who had been found guilty of heresy in Lyon.  The group eventually 
released him to the local magistrate when they were convinced that justice would be done.31  
Other riots explicitly usurped the function of the magistrates, either in mimicking their official 
roles or doing their jobs for them.  Thus in October 1572 in Provins, after a Huguenot was 
hanged for theft and murder, a dispute broke out among a group of Catholic boys about which 
way the corpse was to be dragged.  They elected lawyers and a judge from among the group to 
argue the case in front of a hundred spectators.  Once the direction was determined, they dragged 
the corpse through the streets and set it on fire.32  Rioters also regularly took convicted criminals 
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 Edward P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past and Present 
50 (1971): 78. 
29
 Davis, “Rites of Violence,” 161. 
30
 Ibid., 162. 
31
 Ibid., 163. 
32
 Ibid., 163. 
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from the prison and carried out their sentences.  This happened to a man named Bosroger who, 
since he was accused of being a Huguenot, was beaten and then shot to death by a Catholic mob 
in Rouen in 1562.  The mob left his corpse on the pavement, where it lay for twenty-eight 
hours.33 
Third, religious rioters attacked the authorities with whom they disagreed.  If the object 
of their angst was the king, then they attacked symbols of his power.  This was especially true 
during the reign of King Henry III, who promulgated the Edict of Beaulieu in 1576 that gave 
Huguenots the right of public worship.  In December 1588, King Henry also ordered the 
assassination of Henry I Duke of Guise, an influential member of the Catholic League.  The next 
year a man named Duranti, the president of the Parlement of Toulouse, died at the hands of a 
mob because they believed he supported Henry’s assassination of the Duke of Guise.  The crowd 
dragged him through the streets, hanged him alongside a picture of the king, and then pillaged 
his home.  It was even rumored that a portrait of the king was buried with Duranti, an obvious 
indication of the king’s unpopularity.34 
 Fourth, the crowd sought to provide for “the defense of true doctrine and the refutation of 
false doctrine through dramatic challenges and tests.”35  In other words, the crowd’s religious 
violence can be understood by appealing to an underlying belief system.36  Recall Saint-
Médard’s parish, which began tolling its bells to interrupt a nearby Huguenot service in 
December 1561.  When a Protestant delegation failed to convince the Catholics to silence their 
bells, a fight broke out between the two sides.  In the ensuing struggle, the Huguenots stole 
                                                 
33
 Potter, ed. and trans., The French Wars of Religion, 61-62. 
34
 Beik, “The Violence of the French Crowd,” 85. 
35
 Davis, “Rites of Violence,” 156. 
36
 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, 60. 
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Saint-Médard’s chalices and destroyed its statues and crosses.37  In this case, the belief systems 
of both polemics provided the motivation to disrupt the other’s service.  Consider another 
example.  After the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, Catholic crowds from Normandy and 
Provence stuffed pages of the Protestant Bible into the mouths and wounds of Huguenot corpses, 
saying, “They preached the truth of their God.  Let them call him to their aid.”38  According to 
the Catholics in the crowd, this effectively demonstrated the inefficacy of Protestantism. 
It was common for these “dramatic challenges” to occur during important religious 
festivals, a characteristic of ritualized violence from the medieval period.  In his seminal work, 
Communities of Violence, David Nirenberg argues that popular violence expressed communal 
identity.39  In order to make his case, Nirenberg explores the interactions between Christian, 
Jewish, and Islamic communities in southern France and the territories of the Crown of Aragon 
during the Middle Ages.  Nirenberg discovers that all three groups frequently participated in a 
dialogue of violence that defined social boundaries.  He further argues that communal violence 
was common and ritualized, especially during Holy Week, and that coexistence for these groups 
“was in part predicated on such violence.”40  He finds that popular violence always targeted 
specific individuals for particular reasons, and that the violence was usually non-lethal. 
Nirenberg’s analysis suggests that popular religious violence in the medieval period 
enforced a status quo.  The same theoretical structure applies to Catholic riots in the Wars of 
Religion.  For example, on Palm Sunday in 1561, Toulousain Huguenots decided to express their 
faith by orchestrating a procession of palms through the streets, the city’s first major 
manifestation of Protestantism.  A few days later, the authorities burned at the stake an 
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 Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, 61-62. 
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 Davis, “Rites of Violence,” 157. 
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 Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1998), 9. 
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 Ibid., 200-202; 9. 
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apothecary and a bookseller from Geneva who were accused of participating in the procession.41  
Violence with startlingly similar roots recurred five years later during Pentecost at Pamiers.  
Catholics usually celebrated the holy day by singing and dancing around a statue of St. Anthony, 
which they carried around town in a procession.  In previous years, local Protestants disrupted 
the festivities by throwing stones at the Catholics.  But in 1566, when the Catholic procession 
reached a Protestant neighborhood they began shouting, “Kill! Kill!” and three days of fighting 
resulted.42  In both of these examples, the perpetrators of the violence sought to discredit the 
belief system of their targets, and the specific context of a religious festival allowed them to do 
so.  The same theme appeared again and again in religious riots. 
Violence frequently revolved around the Eucharist, one of the major sources of division 
in the Reformation.43  This was especially true whenever a priest carried the Host outside of the 
confines of a Catholic church.  While Catholics paused to kneel in front of the priest—men also 
removed their hats—Protestants who wished to deny the validity of the sacrament would remain 
standing, a sign of disrespect in the eyes of Catholic partisans.  On a Sunday in March 1571 in 
Rouen, a group of Huguenots were walking to their own service as they passed by a priest 
carrying the Host to a sick person.  Catholics yelled at the Huguenots because they would not 
acknowledge the sacrament, and the Huguenots replied by throwing stones at the Catholics.  A 
fight broke out between the two sides, and forty Huguenots were killed.44  It was especially 
common for violence to accompany Corpus Christi, a holy day on which priests prominently 
carried the Host, displayed in a monstrance, in a procession throughout town.  In August 1562, a 
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 Pierre-Jean Souriac, “Du corps à corps au combat fictif.  Quand les catholiques toulousains affrontaient leurs 
homologues protestants,” in Les affrontements: Usages, discours et rituels, ed. Frédérique Pitou and Jacqueline 
Sainclivier (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008), 26. 
42
 Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe, 200. 
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Huguenot bookseller refused to kneel in front of the procession, and Parisian children seized 
him, killed him by “tearing him to pieces,” and then set his corpse on fire at a garbage dump.45 
Popular violence did not always occur as a direct response to a specific provocation.  The 
fifth motivation for popular violence started with the shift from attacking “the other” because of 
his beliefs, to attacking “the other” because he was “the other.”  This shift can be seen in the 
association of “the other” with garbage and pollution.  In 1560, Huguenots from Rouen threw 
garbage at a Corpus Christi procession, and during the spring of 1572, Catholics hurled mud and 
garbage at houses belonging to Protestants near the Pont Notre-Dame.46  This analogy can also 
be found in the pamphlets that circulated around French cities.  Federicus Morellus, a cleric who 
witnessed the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, wrote a treatise in which he blames the civil 
wars on Admiral Gaspard de Coligny and “a few others” (paucis aliis).47  He repeatedly refers to 
these Huguenots throughout his tract as “a stain” (macula), “filth” (limus), and “pollution” 
(pollutio).48 
The association of “the other” with pollution was deeply rooted in the medieval period.  
In The Formation of a Persecuting Society, the eminent historian R. I. Moore argues that from 
the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, clerics and courtiers invented a new “rhetoric and a set of 
assumptions and procedures” that made persecution “more likely to happen” and “more severe 
and sustained for longer.”49  Moore understands persecution as any violent action or verbal insult 
that separated a targeted individual from the community, either through death or by exile.  In 
other words, Moore’s thesis proposes that the authorities created an environment in which 
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 Potter, ed. and trans., The French Wars of Religion, 62-63. 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 80. 
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persecution could be committed against heretics and Jews, and that this environment continued 
to exist long after the thirteenth century.  This persecution took the form of communal 
purification, in which the authorities eradicated specific targets lest they pollute the 
community.50  Although Moore admits that this type of persecution was not “popular violence,” 
the same motivation clearly manifested itself in early modern religious riots.51 
Catholics associated Protestantism with sexual deviance and libertinism, a perception that 
was reinforced by the secrecy of their services.52  Huguenots were also suspicious of the secrecy 
of the Catholic Mass, which was performed in Latin with the priest facing away from the 
congregation.  In addition, Catholics thought that the Protestants were planning a coup against 
the French government.  A former Huguenot who converted to Catholicism, Pierre Charpentier, 
vouched for this conspiracy in a letter to his friend and former colleague François Portus, stating, 
“For what does the “Cause” [of the Huguenots] have in common?  I have learned that it does not 
pertain to the true worship of God, but has rebellion as its object.”53  The pollution analogy and 
the mutual suspicions of secrecy, combined with rumors of a grand Protestant conspiracy, all 
provided a key shift towards the dehumanization of the enemy, which supplied a rationalization 
for exceedingly bloody violence.54 
Both Catholics and Protestants believed that the only way a community could rid itself of 
“the polluting other” was by violently eliminating it.55  However, the violence in Catholic 
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communal purification differed from that in Protestant communal purification.  Whereas 
Catholics typically committed acts of violence against the bodies of their enemies, Protestants 
usually focused their energy on vandalizing Catholic property.  The common way of eliminating 
waste products was by dumping them into a river, which is how Catholic crowds discarded 
enemy corpses throughout the Wars of Religion.  This happened to a Huguenot military leader at 
Sens who was dragged through the streets by children.  At each street corner they stopped to 
burn his body with oven spits, and then they threw his body along with those of several other 
dead Huguenots into the river Yonne.56  Similarly, Protestants sought to eradicate Catholic 
idolatry by desecrating symbols of Catholicism, especially the Host.  Huguenot expressions of 
iconoclasm happened across France throughout the Wars of Religion.57 
The identification of patterns in religious violence, however, needs to be qualified in 
order to remain valid—not every example of popular religious violence follows this division.  
Huguenots usually focused their energy on assailing Catholic priests when they attacked the 
bodies of their enemies.  For example, an audacious Huguenot wrestled the pastor of Saint-
Séverin’s parish to the floor during Mass on December 22, 1563.58  Huguenots occasionally 
committed acts of mass murder, which is what happened at Reims in 1567 when the Protestants 
killed eighty Catholics.59  Protestant armies also contributed to massacres, such as those at 
Beaugency and Mornas in 1563.60  French Catholics typically sought personal financial gain 
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whenever they attacked Huguenot property.  This was especially true for Catholic militias; they 
pillaged Huguenot houses at Troyes in April 1568.61 
The different forms of communal purification undertaken by Catholics and Protestants 
occurred for two main reasons.  Catholic violence in large measure reflected behavioral patterns 
of early modern French and European societies.  A growing volume of scholarship has revealed 
rates of reported homicide and assault far above late twentieth and early twenty-first century 
levels.  Moreover, close studies of early modern societies reveal that physical violence was not 
confined to the poor and marginalized.  Elites possessed as ready a recourse to violence as their 
social inferiors, and riots for a variety of reasons were as common in early modern society as are 
strikes in modern society.62  The real question, thus, is not so much why Catholics frequently 
resorted to physical violence as why Protestants eschewed it much of the time.  The answer 
seems to lie in the fact that Huguenots were always in the minority throughout France even if 
they constituted a majority in specific urban areas in the southern part of the country.63  In other 
words, Protestants had insufficient numerical strength to commit widespread and prolonged 
massacres, so they usually destroyed Catholic property and attacked Catholic priests instead. 
Catholic crowds, however, often did not simply “purify” their communities by killing 
Protestants—they frequently continued to mutilate their corpses long after death in paradoxical 
desecration.  Examples abound in the primary sources, and one historian states that, “Most of the 
real cruelty, when it occurred, was inflicted on corpses, not on living persons.”64  For instance, in 
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Rouen in February 1563, a crowd assembled to witness the execution of two criminals, one 
Catholic and one Protestant.  While the Catholic criminal recanted his sins and died in 
communion with the Roman Church, the Protestant refused to renounce his beliefs.  Instead of 
allowing the Protestant to die by hanging, as the order of his execution stated, the crowd cut the 
rope and lit a bonfire underneath his heels.  But before he died, the crowd hacked his body into 
pieces, dragged it through the streets, and dumped it into the river Seine.65  In another case, after 
the Battle of Cognat in 1569, the body of a Protestant captain was exhumed by his Catholic 
enemies and stabbed several times.  They dragged the rotting corpse through the streets and then 
fed it to farm animals.66 
Catholic crowds mutilated corpses for three main reasons.  First, the crowd wished to 
deny their target the dignity of a Christian burial.  If the Huguenots were not worthy of life, then 
they did not even deserve the solace of a proper resting place.  Second, the crowd’s anger was 
not satiated with the death of their target.  This explains why the crowd continued to inflict 
violence on corpses long after the body could be recognized.  Third, the mutilation of corpses 
was not an impulse—it was a pan-European form of violence that predated the Reformation.67  
The practice was not exclusive to mobs; the authorities also ordered the corpses of criminals to 
be dragged and mutilated in order to make an example for the community.  For instance, the 
Parlement of Paris issued an edict in 1573 stating: 
To repair these crimes, [the Parlement] has ordered and orders that the body of 
Coligny if found may, if it is intact, be taken by the executor of high justice, led, 
taken & dragged on the dirt… to be hanged in the gallows which for this purpose 
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will be built & erected in front of the city hall… hanging there in the most high & 
eminent place.68 
 
Thus the mutilation of corpses was an ordinary form of violence inherited from the medieval 
period. 
 
II. Private Violence: The Duel and Tyrannicide 
 
Cruel man of blood, barbarous hand, and infamous 
Animal without reason, what made you pollute? 
If Satan could prevail, to such an extent on your soul, 
Why treacherously kill your true Prince?69 
 
Soldat François, On the assassination of King Henry IV, 1610 
 
 
Collective violence constitutes only a part of religious violence in the Reformation, for 
the rise of French Protestantism also influenced the individual level of private violence.  Private 
and collective violence can be difficult to distinguish.  Although both categories could involve 
several accomplices, the difference lies in the nature of the violence: private violence always 
occurred between individuals.  However, the term “private” is not meant to imply secrecy, for it 
often occurred in full view of the community.70  Similar to popular violence during the Wars of 
Religion, an analysis of the French duel and tyrannicide reveals deep connections between 
medieval and early modern private violence. 
One type of private violence that played a prominent role in Reformation France was the 
duel, a form of dispute resolution rooted in the medieval period.  In his influential work, Land 
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and Lordship, Otto Brunner develops an understanding of the medieval Austrian feud that can 
provide the background for a discussion of the French duel.  Brunner rejects the notion that the 
feud was an archaic phenomenon flourishing prior to the establishment of a law-abiding 
society.71  He argues that the feud actually represented a deep commitment to a “moral or legal 
duty” to exact retribution for an evil done, and thus was an integral part of the medieval Austrian 
judicial system.72  In Brunner’s analysis, private violence was intimately connected to the 
conception of justice, which was itself predicated upon a man’s honor.73  After the Wars of 
Religion, Frenchmen also believed that the right to bear arms and defend one’s honor was an 
essential aspect of justice.  Since a similar honor system existed in Reformation France, the same 
framework that Brunner posited for medieval Austrian violence can be applied to the French 
duel. 
Before the sixteenth century, it was common for French nobles to resolve conflicts by 
resorting to judicial combat, where the victor won the judicial case.74  The last time a judicial 
duel occurred in France was in 1547, when François de Vivonne, seigneur de la Châtaigneraye, 
battled Guy Chabot, comte de Jarnac, in front of the king.75  It was also commonplace for young 
nobles to prove themselves by participating in a tournament of arms.76  Both of these practices 
declined as adult males entered the military service during the Wars of Religion.  When battle-
hardened men returned from the field around the turn of the century, however, dueling quickly 
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became the most popular mode of conflict resolution for the simple reason that the weakened 
French state was left with much less control over private warfare.77 
The duel reached its zenith of popularity during its “golden age” of the 1620s.78  One 
historian defines the duel as “a fight between two or several individuals (but always with equal 
numbers on each side), equally armed, for the purpose of either proving the truth of a disputed 
question or the valor, courage and honor of each combatant.”79  A man’s honor depended on 
objective criteria such as birth, titles and privileges, and subjective criteria like the opinions of 
others.80  The frequency of dueling declined as a man aged; although, of course, the elderly could 
theoretically challenge someone to a fight.  For example, man named Zamet fought two duels at 
the age of sixty.81  But for the most part, the classic French duel was exclusive to middle-aged 
men of the upper classes. 
Duels typically followed a pattern: someone impugned a man’s honor, he issued a 
challenge to the offender, both sides agreed upon a weapon, and the two dueled.  The weapon of 
choice in the French duel was the rapier, a one-handed sword that nobles usually carried on their 
persons.  It was less common for duelers to use pistols, but it was standard for the duelers to fight 
on foot, without armor, and in public.  Once the authorities outlawed the duel, combatants moved 
away from public areas and into the woods.  This partly explains the lack of sources regarding 
the lethality of the duel, but the best estimate is that between 300 and 500 people died during the 
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first few decades of the seventeenth century.82  Duels often ended before someone died—each 
combatant usually brought his own “seconds” to stop the duel at the sight of first blood. 
Duels between noblemen often took the form of “quarrels over precedence.”83  An insult 
over precedence could involve a simple gesture such as refusing to completely remove one’s hat 
in the presence of another gentleman.  This is exactly what happened between two noblemen, 
Deslandes and Duplessis-Châtillon, in 1640.  The ensuing fight spilled into the streets, resulting 
in wounds for both men.84  But not every insult necessitated a duel, especially if the insulter was 
of a lower social standing.  For instance, the Duke of Elbeuf—an illegitimate member of the 
royal family—refused to participate in a duel after a “simple gentleman” insulted him.85  Insults 
over religion, however, were a guaranteed way to impugn a man’s honor and instigate a duel.  
Since honor was considered “as important as life itself,” it is not surprising that accusing a 
Catholic of being a Huguenot would result in violence.86 
 Even though dueling was technically outlawed after 1602, it remained a common form of 
dispute resolution until Louis XIV’s reign.  One major reason was that the king did not want his 
nobles killing themselves.  Historians estimate that noblemen comprised only about two percent, 
or 380,000, of France’s population during the sixteenth century, and the non-battlefield deaths of 
noblemen put a strain on the military’s leadership.87  The monopolization of force by the state 
and the inculcation of less-violent behaviors in young men were also important factors.  The 
establishment of institutions, such as the Academie d’Equitation founded by Antoine de Pluvinel 
in 1594, taught politeness and manner to young noblemen.  During the seventeenth century it 
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became the mark of a gentleman to be cultured in this sense, although it was still important for 
him to be able to defend his own honor when the occasion arose.88  Thus, just as the Reformation 
inherited the duel from the medieval period, the duel was passed down to later generations. 
 Another form of violence inherited from the medieval period was tyrannicide, which both 
Catholic and Protestant scholars countenanced.89  The philosophical origins of tyrannicide can be 
traced all the way back to pre-Socratic philosophers.  Throughout history, distinguished thinkers 
such as Aristotle and Cicero approved of the practice.90  In the medieval period, John of 
Salisbury and then Thomas Aquinas both sanctioned the killing of a head of state under certain 
conditions.91  Thomas Aquinas appealed to Cicero to justify this position, stating, “Then indeed 
he who kills a tyrant for the liberation of his country, is praised, and he receives a reward.”92  By 
the sixteenth century, Catholics such as Juan Mariana, a Spanish Jesuit who taught in Paris from 
1569-1574, stipulated that if a leader qualified as a tyrant then private citizens had a moral 
responsibility to assassinate him.93  For Mariana, the religious affiliation of the tyrant functioned 
as the most important qualifying criterion.94  Protestants, such as Theodore Beza, advanced a 
somewhat different argument, positing that lesser magistrates should lead a rebellion against a 
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tyrant in defense of the true faith.95  Although speculating about what might justify tyrannicide 
greatly differs from actually killing the king, the manifestations of tyrannicide in Reformation 
France must be understood within these traditions.96  A brief consideration of the assassinations 
of Henry I Duke of Guise (1588), King Henry III (1589), and King Henry IV (1610) reveals the 
unique status of tyrannicide as an innovation from the Wars of Religion. 
Henry I Duke of Guise formed the Holy Catholic League in 1576, an organization that 
unsuccessfully sought to prevent the ascension of Henry III to the throne of France.  The League 
drew most of its members from the Parisian bourgeoisie, not the menu people, which gave its 
leader tremendous political power.97  French Catholics knew Henry as their champion on the 
battlefield; he commanded several military victories over the Huguenots in the Wars of Religion.  
He was also popular because it was rumored that he had ordered the assassination of Admiral 
Gaspard de Coligny, his Huguenot counterpart.  The Duke of Guise also had designs on the 
throne.  On May 12, 1588, the Day of the Barricades, the duke arrived in Paris, incited a revolt, 
and forced the king to flee the city, which left the Catholic League in control of France. 
King Henry needed to act boldly if he was to reassert control over the country, so it is not 
surprising that the Duke of Guise met a violent end.  On December 23, the king summoned the 
duke to the royal court and had him promptly assassinated.  Interestingly, in order to preserve the 
honor of each individual present, multiple assassins killed the duke in a “collective act” by 
stabbing him at the same time.98  As a result, no single person could be blamed for the murder.  
King Henry also ordered the assassination of the duke’s brother, Louis II, Cardinal of Guise, the 
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very next day.  In the aftermath of two assassinations in which he was complicit, the king could 
not remain in control of the government, and he was forced to move with his Parlement to Tours.  
But the Duke of Guise’s death carried more far-reaching consequences than the temporary 
relocation of the king’s Parlement.  For the first time, a French king used religion as the state-
sanctioned rationalization for murder, which qualified him as a tyrant in the eyes of many French 
Catholics.  This led to the downfall of King Henry himself. 
King Henry III was unpopular before the assassination of the Duke of Guise because he 
had aligned himself with Henry of Navarre, a Huguenot and future heir to the throne.  After the 
duke’s death, only a handful of cities remained loyal to the king, so he spent the remainder of his 
reign trying to gain control of France.99  On July 31, 1589, the king spent the night outside of 
Paris at Saint-Cloud, planning to assault the capital.100  On the next day Jacques Clément, a 
twenty-two year old Dominican lay brother, pretended to have a confidential message for the 
king.  Once he was close enough, Clément mortally wounded the king with a dagger that he had 
concealed underneath his cloak.  The royal guards immediately killed Clément, and the king died 
the next day.101 
The first case of tyrannicide in the Reformation sparked an outburst of joy among French 
Catholics.  This was understandable for Parisians, whose city was under siege by the king’s 
army.  But Jacques Clément’s portrait was placed on the altars of several monasteries, Pope 
Sixtus V praised his actions, and many French churchmen even lobbied for his canonization.102  
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Many Catholics saw the killing as a “miracle.”103  The death of the king portended danger for 
future French monarchs. 
Henry of Navarre, the future King Henry IV, was a Huguenot before he ascended to the 
throne, which was a serious concern for many Frenchmen.  After the St. Bartholomew’s Day 
Massacre he was compelled to nominally become Catholic, but he remained a Protestant at 
heart.104  Pope Sixtus V passed a papal bull in 1585 that dispossessed Henry of his rights to the 
crown because of his Protestant sympathies.105  As a result, several politique advisors urged 
Henry to publicly embrace Catholicism and submit to the pope’s wishes.  This is exactly what 
André Maillard argued in a work published in 1585.106  Not only would the traditional 
ceremonies of royal succession have to be adjusted if the prince remained a Huguenot, but a 
Huguenot monarch would send confusing signals about national unity.107  On July 25, 1593 
Henry publicly accepted the Roman faith at the abbey of Saint-Denis in the presence of several 
French bishops.108 
Despite the eventual conversion of Henry and his ascension to the throne, other members 
of French society loathed the king for giving limited freedom of worship to the Huguenots in the 
1598 Edict of Nantes.  Catholic fundamentalists argued that the king embodied the definition of a 
tyrant, and therefore needed to be killed.109  François Ravaillac was a Catholic zealot who 
believed that if the king was murdered, then the Wars of Religion would resume and France 
would be purged of Protestantism once and for all.  On May 14, 1610, he successfully entered 
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the king’s carriage—which was fortuitously exposed due to slow traffic—and stabbed him to 
death.110  Although he never admitted to having any accomplices, the logistics of Ravaillac’s 
attack strongly suggest a wider conspiracy to murder the king.111  Ravaillac was tortured with 
“pincers, molten lead, boiling oil, burning pitch, and molten wax” before he was “dismembered 
by four horses” before his remains were “reduced to ashes and thrown to the wind.”112  This 
punishment was unprecedented only because it combined several pre-existing methods of torture 
within one victim.113  Just as the ideology supporting tyrannicide predated the sixteenth century, 
so too did the punishments for it. 
 
III.  Coexistence and Toleration 
 
Certainly not every Frenchman participated in religious violence, and many were 
vehemently opposed to the civil wars.114  For example, one pamphlet written in 1568 by an 
anonymous author states, “Of all the evils that the civil wars have brought to France, certainly 
the most deplorable and the most pernicious is… violence….  Unto whom God has given the 
grace to see and to know the proper remedies for the [war], the consequence of dubious weapons, 
closes their mouths and ties their hands.”115  Even during the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, a 
relatively small minority of Parisian Catholics carried out the bloodletting while the vast 
majority of Catholics remained at home.116 
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At the same time, not every Frenchman supported the cessation of the Wars of Religion.  
Some Catholics despised Henry IV’s policies of religious coexistence so much so that they 
decided to exile themselves from France.  The majority of these people came from the Parisian 
wing of the Catholic League, and they found a home in the homogenously Catholic city of 
Brussels.117  One historian, when discussing why the Leaguers left their home country, states, 
“The Leaguers were Christians who struggled to reform themselves, they were not unconditional 
Tridentines; they became so out of necessity, because the Catholic Reformation was the only 
credible response to the Protestant Reformation….”118  Once it became apparent in the 1590s 
that Protestantism was a permanent part of France, Catholic Leaguers were forced to choose 
between a multi-religious community or exile. 
Given the endemic violence of the Wars of Religion, it is perplexing that early modern 
France produced the first European experiment with religious coexistence.  The Edict of 
Beaulieu (1576), the Edict of Poitiers (1577), and the Edit of Nantes (1598) gave Protestants 
unprecedented, although qualified, rights to freedom of worship.  And yet religious violence did 
not simply fade into the past after the Edict of Nantes.  The mutilation of corpses persisted 
throughout the early modern period, noblemen continued to duel into the twentieth century, and 
the speculative justifications for regicide remained powerful after the Wars of Religion.119  
Religious tolerance was not always assured; in the 1685 Edict of Fontainebleau, King Louis XIV 
revoked the rights granted to Huguenots almost a century earlier.  Thus just as the patterns of 
violence inherited by Frenchmen in the Protestant and Catholic Reformations derived from the 
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medieval period, the same forms of violence persisted throughout France long after the sixteenth 
century. 
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